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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson* 
T HE Virginia General Assembly continued its increased legisla-tive activity in the area of wills, trusts, and estates during the 
past year by passing three major acts: Exempt Property and Al-
lowances;1 Acts Barring Property Rights;2 and the Virginia Small 
Estate Act. 3 In addition to these major bills, seven additional acts 
enacted by the General Assembly and four cases decided by the 
Supreme Court of Virginia involved issues important to both the 
general practitioner and the specialist in wills and trusts. This arti-
cle reviews these legislative and judicial developments, with em-
phasis on the three most important legislative enactments. 
I. EXEMPT PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES 
This comprehensive Act was designed to respond to the immedi-
ate economic needs of the surviving spouse and minor children of a 
deceased Virginia domiciliary. Specifically, the legislation (i) pro-
vides a family allowance' for their support during the probate pe-
riod, (ii) establishes an allowance of the decedent's tangible per-
sonal property11 for their continued use, and (iii) creates a true 
homestead allowance6 in an attempt to ensure that they might exit 
probate with a minimum "nest-egg" even when the estate is insol-
vent. The Act repeals all existing statutes7 relating to the support 
rights of a surviving spouse and minor children and replaces them 
with five integrated code sections based upon corresponding sec-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond, Virginia. 
1 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 580 (codified at Va. Code Ann.§§ 64.1-151.1 to .5 (Cum. Supp. 1981)) 
(repealing Va. Code Ann. §§ 34-10 to -12, -15 to -16, 64.1-126 to -127 (Cum. Supp. 1981); 
amending Va. Code Ann.§§ 34-17, -23 to -24, 64.1-11, -154 to -155, -157 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). 
• Id., ch. 469 (codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-401 to -415 (Repl. Vol 1981)) (repealing 
Va. Code Ann.§ 64.1-18 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). 
• Id., ch. 281 (codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 64.1-132.1 to .4 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). 
• Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-151.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
• Id. § 64.1-151.2. 
I Id. § 64.1-151.3. 
7 See note 1 supra. For a discussion of the repealed statutes, see Johnson, Support of the 
Surviving Spouse and Minor Children in Virginia: Proposed Legislation v. Present Law, 14 
U. Rich. L. Rev. 639 (1980). 
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tions of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).8 
A. The Family Allowance 
The family allowance provides for the maintenance of the sur-
viving spouse and minor children whom the decedent was obli-
gated to support by awarding them a "reasonable allowance in 
money"9 from the decedent's estate during the entire probate pe-
riod. If the estate is insolvent, however, the family allowance may 
not continue beyond one year.10 Because a basic aim of the family 
allowance provision is to make necessary funds available to the 
family as soon as reasonably possible, it allows the personal repre-
sentative to determine and disburse the allowance in a lump sum 
not exceeding $6,000 or in periodic payments of no more than $500 
per month for one year, without prior court approval.11 Because 
some families will require a larger allowance or a longer period of 
time, and because some personal representatives may use this al-
lowance unfairly to divert funds away from creditors, the General 
Assembly provided that the personal representative, or any recipi-
ent, creditor, or beneficiary who feels "aggrieved" by the personal 
representative's action or inaction, may petition the circuit court 
ex parte for "appropriate relief."12 In those instances where the 
need is greater than $500 per month, for example, the personal 
representative can make an immediate lump sum award up to the 
limit of his authority ($6,000). This award would be sufficient to 
respond to the family's immediate needs until the personal repre-
sentative, the spouse, or someone acting on behalf of the minor 
children could bring the matter before the circuit court for a deter-
mination of "a reasonable allowance in money" for the duration of 
the case in question. 
The family allowance is ordinarily disbursed to the surviving 
spouse for the use of the surviving spouse and the minor children. 
If any of the minor children do not reside with the surviving 
8 Uniform Probate Code §§ 2-401 to -404. 
• Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-151.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
io Id. 
II Id. § 64.1-151.4. 
12 Id. This section also extends the right of any interested person to petition the circuit 
court ex parte to those who are aggrieved by any action or inaction in connection with the 
allowance of tangible personal property, see notes 15-18 infra and accompanying text, or the 
homestead allowance, see notes 19-23 infra and accompanying text. 
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spouse, the allowance may be apportioned among the spouse and 
the children "as their needs may appear"; a nonresident child's 
portion is payable to the one having the care and custody of the 
child.13 The portion of the family allowance allocable to the surviv-
ing spouse does not qualify for the federal estate tax marital de-
duction because it is a "terminable" interest,1" i.e., the death of 
any recipient will terminate that person's right to any unpaid al-
lowance. The family allowance provision, therefore, does not alter 
current methods of determining the "marital" share in a standard 
marital deduction will, nor does it reduce the amount otherwise 
allocable to the marital share in such a will. 
B. The Tangible Personal Property Allowance 
The allowance of tangible personal property to the surviving 
spouse, or to the minor children if there is no surviving spouse, is 
designed to ensure that a minimum quantity of "household furni-
ture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances and personal effects" 
will be preserved for the continued use of the family.115 Because all 
families will not be similarly situated or have the same needs, the 
General Assembly did not attempt to enumerate specific articles to 
vest in every family. The legislators instead established an allow-
ance with a value of $3,500 in excess of any security interests in 
the property chosen, and allowed the surviving spouse to select any 
tangible personal property from the estate until the $3,500 limit is 
reached. If the estate contains less than $3,500 worth of personal 
property, the surviving spouse may receive other assets of the es-
tate. The only restriction on the freedom of choice of the surviving 
spouse (or the one selecting on behalf of the minor children) is 
that this spouse cannot select property specifically bequeathed or 
devised when other assets in the estate are available.16 In order 
to prevent the exempt-articles statute from affecting unfairly the 
claims of creditors or beneficiaries, a nonuniform amendment 
based on a parallel provision in debtor-creditor law17 allows the 
personal representative to execute a deed describing and valuing 
•• Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-151.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
" Uniform Probate Code § 2-403 comment. 
'" Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-151.2 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
14 Id. § 64.1-151.4. 
17 Id. § 34-14 (Repl. Vol. 1976). 
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each article of property set aside to the family.18 
C. The Homestead Allowance 
The last of the cumulative allowances in the Act is a $5,000 
homestead allowance in favor of the surviving spouse or in favor of 
the minor children of the decedent if there is no surviving spouse.19 
The homestead allowance, along with the family allowance and the 
exempt-articles allowance, has priority over all creditor claims 
against the decedent's estate.20 Although the Act provides that the 
family allowance21 and the exempt articles allowance22 are availa-
ble to a family in addition to the other entitlements they receive 
by testate or intestate succession or statutory right, it does not ac-
cord similar treatment to the homestead allowance. 23 Because the 
homestead allowance is designed to ensure a minimum "nest-egg," 
if an equivalent or greater amount of money passes to or for the 
benefit of the family through other entitlements, the additional al-
lowance of the homestead exemption would result in an unin-
tended benefit. Thus, the spouse who receives dower or curtesy in 
the decedent's realty or a forced statutory share in the decedent's 
personalty forfeits the right to a homestead allowance. Similarly, 
the surviving spouse, or the children if there is no surviving spouse, 
must elect between taking the testate or intestate succession or 
taking the homestead allowance, except in those cases where the 
succession right is less than $5,000. In the latter case, the Act al-
lows a reduced homestead allowance to bring the succession 
amount up to $5,000. 24 
All of these provisions are protective rights that a family may 
elect on an "as needed" basis, much as a surviving spouse may 
elect to renounce a decedent's will and take a forced statutory 
18 Id.§ 64.1-151.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981). The same procedure is available in connection with 
property set aside pursuant to the homestead allowance. See notes 19-23 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
19 Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-151.3 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
20 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 580, cl. 3, which is not codified, provides that "the provisions of this 
act shall not affect homestead waivers executed on or prior to June thirty, nineteen hundred 
eighty-one, or to the renewal of an indebtedness executed prior to such date if the prior 
indebtedness contained such a waiver." 
21 Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-151.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
22 Id. § 64.1-151.2. 
2
• Id. § 64.1-152.3. 
2
• Id. 
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share of the personal estate. A second nonuniform amendment, 
based on the provision for the election of a forced statutory 
share,25 provides that the election to take any or all of these al-
lowances must be made within one year of the decedent's death by 
filing a notarized writing in the office of the clerk of the circuit 
court that has jurisdiction over probate or the administration of 
the estate.28 In the overwhelming majority of cases, the family will 
not make such an election because the estate will be solvent and it 
will be left to or for the benefit of the family. In the remaining 
cases, there may be a period of uncertainty as probate officials, 
attorneys, and fiduciaries implement these new provisions for the 
first time. Interested parties can minimize this uncertainty by us-
ing as interpretive guides the official comments to the sections of 
the UPC upon which these new laws largely are based,27 as well as 
by looking for guidance from other states that have adopted these 
provisions of the UPC.28 
II. ACTS BARRING PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The common law maxim that a wrongdoer should not profit 
from his own wrong often has been the basis for preventing one 
who has wrongfully killed another from succeeding to the property 
of his victim or in any other way benefiting from his wrongful kill-
ing. The strong public policy embodied in this common law princi-
ple and the desire to provide a framework within which to grant 
remedies in the future have caused a number of states to pass stat-
utes that seek to prevent such unjust enrichment.29 The Virginia 
General Assembly first enacted a statute dealing with this problem 
in 191980 and amended it several times thereafter before repealing 
and replacing it by this new act in 1981. 81 The problems with Vir-
•• Id. § 64.1-13 (Repl. Vol. 1980) . 
.. Id. § 64.1-151.5 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
•• See Uniform Probate Code §§ 2-401 to -404 & comments . 
.. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah have adopted the Uniform Probate 
Code. Table of Jurisdictions, 8 U.L.A. (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
•• For a general discussion of the authorities, see Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 1116 (1972). 
•• Va. Code§ 5274 (1919) (amended 1962). For a discussion of the history of this section, 
see Life Ins. Co. v. Cashatt, 206 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Va. 1962). 
21 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 469 (codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-401 to -415 (Repl. Vol. 1981)) 
(repealing Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-18 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). The Virginia Code Commission 
assigned the existing section numbers to the new Act. The original numbers were §§ 55-355 
526 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 68:521 
ginia's preceding statute were three-fold. First, it required that the 
wrongdoer have been convicted of murder, thus failing to provide a 
remedy in those cases where the wrongful killer was accused of 
manslaughter, where he was accused of murder but convicted of a 
lesser included offense or acquitted, or where he committed suicide 
prior to any judicial determination of his guilt. Second, the old 
statute dealt only with cases where the killer took from the victim 
by testate or intestate succession or pursuant to an insurance pol-
icy on the victim's life, thus failing to prohibit a taking by survi-
vorship in a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety, by the law of 
dower, curtesy or forced statutory share, or by other, less common 
ways of taking. Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia had classi-
fied the prior act as a penal statute and so had construed it nar-
rowly rather than liberally, thus failing to carry out the obvious 
public policy it represented. 32 
The latter two problems have been eliminated by the new Act, 
which is based upon a proposed Model Act drafted by Dean John 
W. Wade almost a half century ago.33 The Act begins with a sec-
tion34 defining the terms "slayer,"311 "decedent" and "property" 
and then makes the broad policy statement that "[n]either the 
slayer nor any person claiming through him shall in any way ac-
quire any property or receive any benefits" as the result of the pro-
hibited act. 36 It then addresses the "method of taking" problem 
discussed above with nine sections that catalog various means of 
taking benefit from the decedent's property and that specify who 
shall take such benefit instead of the slayer in each case. 37 The Act 
addresses the "narrow construction" problem associated with the 
prior statute by specifically declaring that the Act is not penal and 
to -369. This explains the reference in § 55-413 to "§ 55-355," which inadvertently was left 
unchanged. The correct reference would be to § 55-401. 
s• For a discussion of the prior law, see Comment, Barring Slayers' Acquisition of Prop-
erty Rights in Virginia: A Proposed Statute, 14 U. Rich. L. Rev. 251 (1979). 
ss Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A Statutory Solution, 49 
Harv. L. Rev. 715 (1936). According to Bolich, Acts Barring Property Rights, 40 N.C.L. Rev. 
175, 188 (1962), the laws of North Carolina, Pennsylvania and South Dakota also are based 
upon the Wade proposal. The Virginia variations from the Wade proposal are discussed in 
Comment, supra note 32. 
04 Va. Code Ann. § 55-401 (Repl. Vol. 1981). 
35 See text accompanying note 43 infra. 
s• Va. Code Ann. § 55-402 (Repl. Vol. 1981). 
s7 Id. §§ 55-403 to -411. 
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should be "construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this 
Commonwealth."38 The Act contains three additional provisions 
that protect bona fide purchasers from the slayer, 39 deal with the 
use of the criminal record in the civil proceeding;'0 and provide 
that the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is not applicable to 
cases governed by the Act. 41 
The prior statute's restricted applicability remains, however, be-
cause the new Act narrowly defines the term "slayer." The bill 
originally def"med "slayer" to mean "any person who participates, 
either as a principal or as an accessory before the fact, in the will-
ful and unlawful killing of any other person."•2 As amended by the 
House Courts of Justice Committee, however, the final version of 
the bill that was enacted into law def"med "slayer" to mean "any 
person who is convicted of the murder of the decedent."43 
It is clear, therefore, that there is no statutory remedy prevent-
ing unjust enrichment when the person accused of wrongfully kill-
ing another is not convicted of murder. With the absence of a stat-
utory remedy, the issue becomes whether the common law remedy 
of constructive trust is available in such cases in Virginia. Al-
though decided under the old statute,•• the recent case of Sundin 
v. Klein"5 is instructive in determining whether the Supreme Court 
of Virginia will regard the statutory remedy as exclusive. 
The issue in Sundin was whether the Court should impose a 
constructive trust to prevent a husband, convicted of the murder 
of his wife, from taking by right of survivorship his wife's half of 
their tenancy by the entirety."6 Counsel for the convicted murderer 
" Id. § 55-414. 
.. Id. § 55-412. 
•• Id. § 55-413. 
41 Id. § 55-415. 
•• Va. H. 684, 1980 Sess. § 55-355.1 (1981). 
0 Va. Code Ann. § 55-401.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981). 
44 See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text. 
0 221 Va. 232, 269 S.E.2d 787 (1980). See notes 87-88 infra and accompanying text. 
•• The Court noted that 
"[c]onstructive trusts have been said to arise through the application of the doctrine 
of estoppel, or under the hroad doctrine that equity regards and treats as done what 
in good conscience ought to be done. * * * Their forms and varieties are practically 
without limit, being raised by courts of equity whenever it becomes necessary to pre-
vent a failure of justice." 
Id. at 240, 269 S.E.2d at 791-92 (quoting Patterson's Ex'rs v. Patterson, 144 Va. 113, 123, 
131 S.E. 217, 220 (1926)). 
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argued that the Court was foreclosed from furnishing a remedy be-
cause the statute contained no prohibition dealing with survivor-
ship cases."7 In deciding to impose a constructive trust for the ben-
efit of the wife's estate, the Court responded to counsel's argument 
as follows: 
To say this . . . suggests that the General Assembly condones 
the acquisition by murder of all property rights not mentioned in 
[the old statute]. We know that such a proposition cannot be true. 
Indeed, we believe that [the statute] constitutes legislative recogni-
tion of a broad public policy against the acquisition of property 
rights by murder. We believe further that it is the duty of this 
court to attempt to give effect to the pronounced public policy by 
fashioning a remedy to protect the specific interest at issue in this 
case.-'8 
In Sundin, therefore, the Court decided that public policy justi-
fied imposing a constructive trust in a case not specifically ad-
dressed by the prior statute. Nevertheless, in light of the General 
Assembly's rejection of a more liberal definition of "slayer," it re-
mains an open question whether the Court will impose a construc-
tive trust against a wrongdoer who does not fit within the current 
statutory definition."9 A possible answer comes from North Caro-
lina. That state, which also based its statute on Dean Wade's 
Model Act, 110 has resolved the question by imposing the common 
law remedy of constructive trust in cases where the wrongdoer is 
not a "slayer" as that term is defined in the North Carolina 
statute.111 
" Id. at 235, 269 S.E.2d at 788. 
•• Id. 
•• The Supreme Court of Virginia refused a petition for appeal under the old statute in a 
case where one survivorship tenant killed another but was acquitted by reason of insanity. 
See Whitehurst v. Whitehurst, 220 Va. clii (1979). See also Sundin, 221 Va. at 235 n.1, 269 
S.E.2d at 788 n.1. 
•• See note 33 supra. 
•• For a discussion of North Carolina's extension of common law constructive trust relief 
to cases where no remedy is available under the statute because the wrongdoer is not a 
"slayer," see Note, Decedents' Estates-Forfeitures of Property Rights by Slayers, 12 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 448 (1976). It is noteworthy that, in addition to having language that paral-
lels that found in the Virginia act, Va. Code Ann. § 55-414 (Repl. Vol. 1981), quoted at text 
accompanying note 38 supra, the construction section of the North Carolina statute, N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 31~-15 (Repl. Vol. 1976), also contains the following language: 
As to all acts specifically provided for in this Chapter, the rules, remedies, and proce-
dures herein specified shall be exclusive, and as to all acts not specifically provided 
0 
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m. VmGINIA SMALL ESTATE Ac:r 
The Virginia Small Estate Act112 was designed to address the 
problem of administering a decedent's estate that contains only a 
small amount of probate personal property. The problem is not 
confined to small estates, but also exists in large estates where the 
use of inter vivos trusts, survivorship property, and other probate-
avoidance devices can result in the estate's containing a relatively 
small amount of probate personal property. 
The term "probate personal property" refers to personalty in a 
decedent's name that typically cannot be recovered from an obligor 
(such as an indebtedness) or that cannot be transferred to a new 
owner (such as stock in a non-Virginia corporation) without the 
assistance of the probate process. If the obligor or the transfer 
agent pays or transfers at the request of one other than the estate's 
duly authorized personal representative, he runs the risk that he 
may not receive an effective discharge and so may become person-
ally liable if a court subsequently determines that the payment or 
transfer was made improperly. The choice presented to the family 
of the decedent, therefore, is either to spend the time and money 
required to complete the probate process or simply to abandon the 
property. Even if the family decides that the property is of suffi-
cient value to warrant completing the probate process, the costs 
may prove disproportionate to the value that the family finally 
realizes. 113 
The new Virginia Small Estate Act, based upon comparable pro-
visions in the UPC,114 responds to the family's dilemma by provid-
ing for the de facto administration of a limited amount of probate 
personal property611 by an affidavit process, rather than by the 
for in this Chapter, all rules, remedies, and procedures, if any, which now exist or 
hereafter may exist either by virtue of statute, or by virtue of the inherent powers of 
any court of competent jurisdiction, or otherwise, shall be applicable. 
11 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 281 (codified at Va. Code Ann. §§ 64.1-132.1 to .4 (Cum. Supp. 
1981)). The Virginia Code Commission assigned these section numbers to the Act; the origi-
nal section numbers were §§ 64.1-125.1 to .4. 
11 For a discusson of the prior law and the need for change, see Word, Updating Virginia's 
Probate Law, 4 U. Rich. L. Rev. 223 (1970). 
54 Uniform Probate Code §§ 3-1201 to -1202. 
11 The total probate personalty must not exceed $5,000. Va. Code Ann. § 64.l-132.2(A)(l) 
(Cum. Supp. 1981). See text accompanying note 59 infra. The Act will not resolve fully the 
problem of administering probate personal property until this ceiling either is raised or 
eliminated. 
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standard probate process. The Act begins by defining a "succes-
sor" as any noncreditor entitled to the personal property of a dece-
dent by either testate or intestate succession. 58 It next provides 
that anyone "may" pay or deliver personalty to, 57 and a transfer 
agent "shall" transfer stock at the request of,58 a successor who 
presents him with an affidavit stating that (1) the total probate 
personalty does not exceed $5,000, (2) sixty or more days have 
passed since the decedent's death, (3) no one has applied for quali-
fication as personal representative, (4) any will has been probated 
and a list of heirs has been filed, and (5) the successor is entitled 
to payment or delivery of the property for the reason stated in the 
affidavit.59 
The Act provides that anyone who pays, delivers, or transfers in 
reliance upon such an affidavit is discharged to the same extent as 
if the person had dealt with a personal representative.80 The obli-
gor or transfer agent need not verify the correctness of the facts in 
the affidavit nor see to the proper application of the property paid, 
delivered, or transferred.81 Although the successor who recovers 
the property is accountable to the estate's personal representative 
if one later qualifies, or to another person with a superior right to 
the property, the original obligor or transfer agent who relied on 
the affidavit is not similarly liable.82 Because of the protection that 
the Act affords to those who rely on the successor's affidavit, it will 
encourage voluntary compliance with requests made by successors. 
Nevertheless, the Act gives successors standing to compel pay-
ment, delivery, or, if necessary, transfer by suit.83 
08 Va. Code Ann.§ 64.1-132.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
•• Id. § 64.1-132.2(A). 
08 Id. § 64.I-132.2(B). 
•• Id. § 64.l-132.2(A). 
•• Id. § 64.1-132.3. 
•
1 Id. 
•• Id. 
"" Id. If an obligor's or transfer agent's sole reason for refusing to comply is the absence of 
a personal representative, however, it would be faster and cheaper for the successor to qual-
ify as a personal representative than to sue pursuant to this section, especially when the 
successor is dealing with a foreign transfer agent. 
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IV. OTHER LEGISLATION 
A. Reformation of Private Trusts 
This legislation is designed to give the Commonwealth access to 
property held in a discretionary trust created for the benefit of an 
incompetent whenever the incompetent beneficiary "has received 
benefits from any State or from any State and federal program of 
public assistance. "8' Parents of incompetents often create discre-
tionary trusts to which the incompetent is the sole possible lifetime 
beneficiary or may be one of several beneficiaries. The trustee of 
such a trust ordinarily is granted great discretion concerning who 
is to be paid from the trust, as well as the amount and timing of 
any payments. The beneficiary of a true discretionary trust, there-
fore, has no rights to any funds-he is merely a permissible recipi-
ent. 85 Furthermore, the present law88 providing for recovery from 
the incompetent's estate for the expenses of his care, treatment, 
and maintenance in a state institution gives the Commonwealth no 
greater rights to the discretionary trust than those enjoyed by the 
incompetent. 
The new legislation attempts to assist the Commonwealth in re-
covering funds from incompetent beneficiaries of discretionary 
trusts by allowing it to petition the circuit court to reform the 
trust and to direct the trustee to pay income and corpus to the 
Commonwealth as reimbursement for past and future benefits pro-
vided to the incompetent. 87 The proper manner of implementing 
the statute is difficult to determine, however, because it is poorly 
worded and contains many internal contradictions.88 Moreover, the 
" 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 545 (codified at Va. Code Ann. § 55-19.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981)). The 
original section number was § 55-31.2. The Virginia Code Commission assigned the present 
section number . 
.. G. Bogert, Law of Trusts § 41 (5th ed. 1973) . 
.. Va. Code Ann. § 37.1-105 (Repl. Vol. 1976). The recovery authorized by this section 
"shall not exceed the actual per capita cost for the particular type of service rendered . . . 
[and] in no event shall recovery be permitted for amounts more than five years past due." 
Id. 
•• Id. § 55-19.1 (Repl. Vol. 1981). 
•• Compare the language in the first sentence of id. § 55-19.l(B) (limiting the court's 
order to the trustee to the amount to which the beneficiary "would be entitled in accordance 
with the provisions of the trust"), with the language in the second sentence (authorizing the 
court in a discretionary trust to "direct exercise of such discretion, having due regard for the 
public's interest and for the basic needs of the other beneficiaries of the trust and their 
relationship to the settlor"). Compare also the second sentence with the limiting language of 
532 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 68:521. 
statute limits itself severely by excluding spendthrift trusts from 
its coverage.69 Because most trusts created for incompetents have 
spendthrift clauses among their boilerplate provisions, this excep-
tion will eliminate the rule in most cases. 
B. Commutation and Valuation of Certain Estates and 
Interests 
The General Assembly increased the assumed interest rate used 
in the statutory annuity table, the table of uniform seniority, the 
Makehamized mortality table, and the commutation of certain life 
estates from five percent to eight percent.70 It also made corre-
sponding changes in the sections stating rules and examples of 
calculations. 71 
C. Payment of Small Accounts to Next of Kin 
On occasion, the only probate asset left by a decedent that re-
quires administration of his estate is an account in a financial in-
stitution. In order to eliminate the need for a personal representa-
tive to qualify upon all such estates-and thus to subject the 
estate to the mandatory inventory and accounting require-
ments-Virginia has passed several statutes allowing the next of 
kin to withdraw these funds from accounts in banks,72 savings and 
loan associations,78 and credit unions,7"' provided the accounts do 
not exceed a certain amount. The new legislation715 increases from 
$2,500 to $5,000 the size of share balances that a credit union may 
pay to the decedent's spouse or to his next of kin where there is no 
qualification on the estate. It also reduces the waiting period from 
the decedent's death from 120 days to 60 days. 
the third sentence ("nothing in this section shall permit the circuit court to affect any in-
come or trust res to which the beneficiary receiving public assistance has no legal or equita-
ble entitlement whatsoever"). 
•• "Nothing herein shall permit the invasion of a trust res created under § 55-19 of the 
Code." Id. Va. Code Ann. § 55-19 (Repl. Vol. 1981) is the provision validating spendthrift 
trusts. 
•• 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 612 (amending Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-269.1 to -271, -272.1 to -275, 
-277 (Rep!. Vol. 1981)). 
•1 Id. 
•• Va. Code Ann.§ 6.1-71 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
•• Id. § 6.1-195.29 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). 
•• Id. § 6.1-208.4. 
•• 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 330 (amending Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-208.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). 
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D. Deposition of Absent Witness at Probate 
The procedure for deposing an absent witness to a will formerly 
involved withdrawing the original of the will from the clerk's office 
in order that it might be used during the absent witness's deposi,.. 
tion. New legislation continues to provide for such withdrawal as a 
possibility, but also adds as an alternative that "in the discretion 
of the clerk, the party may be given a certified copy of the 
original. "76 
E. Statement in Lieu of Settlement of Accounts 
The primary purpose of requiring a personal representative to 
file a settlement of his accounts is to inform the decedent's succes-
' sors in interest of the financial transactions involved in the settle-
ment of the estate. Recognizing that such notice is unnecessary 
when the personal representative is also the sole successor in inter-
est, former law77 provided that in lieu of a final account, such a 
personal representative might file an affidavit "that he has, or they 
have, paid all known charges against the estate and, after the time 
required by law, deliver [sic] the residue of the estate to himself, or 
themselves, as such distributee, distributees, beneficiary or bene-
ficiaries. ms 
A new amendment extends this procedure to those cases where 
the sole successor in interest cannot qualify as the sole personal 
representative because he is not a resident of Virginia. 79 In such a 
case, the nonresident must have a resident appointed to serve with 
him as co-personal representative;80 under the former statute, the 
presence of this resident "qualifying" personal representative who 
was not a taker prevented the use of the affidavit. Because the 
amendment by its literal language applies only when the nonresi-
dent personal representative is the "sole"81 successor, it is unclear 
whether local commissioners of accounts will interpret it to apply 
to those cases where more than one nonresident becomes a co-per-
•• Id., ch. 183 (amending Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-87 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). 
77 Va. Code Ann. § 26-20.1 {Rep!. Vol. 1979). 
•• Id. The statute applies when there are multiple personal representatives who are the 
only successors in interest, "if there he not more than three" such persons. Id. 
•• 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 199 (amending Va. Code Ann. § 26-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). 
•• Va. Code Ann. § 26-59 {Rep!. Vol. 1979). 
81 Id. § 26-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
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sonal representative with a "qualifying" Virginia resident. 
F. Proof of Debts and Demands 
Prior Virginia law required a commissioner of accounts faced 
with the task of settling the accounts of a personal representative 
to appoint a time and place for receiving proof of debts or de-
mands against the decedent or his estate, upon the request of a 
proper party.82 A new amendment adds flexibility to this scheme 
by providing that the commissioner "may" appoint a time and 
place for receiving proof of debts and demands at any time, even 
when no accounting is pending.88 The new amendment's purpose is 
to enable personal representatives to become aware of outstanding 
claims at an early date, thereby facilitating the administration of 
the estate. 
G. Recapture of Estate Tax 
The General Assembly has amended the Virginia Estate Tax 
Act84 to include a section providing for a recapture tax in those 
instances where a nonpermissible disposition of any "special use 
valuation" property occurs, or where the special use ceases within 
fifteen years of a decedent's death.85 The amendment aims to re-
capture the amount that the special valuation has saved the 
estate.86 
V. JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
A. Constructive Trusts 
During the past year, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided to 
impose constructive trusts in two cases. In Sundin v. Klein, 81 the 
Court imposed a constructive trust to prevent a convicted mur-
derer from taking from his deceased wife by survivorship in a ten-
ancy by the entirety. Although the Court decided this case under a 
statute since repealed by the new Acts Barring Property Rights 
82 Id. § 64.1-171 (Repl. Vol. 1980). 
83 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 484 (amending Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-171 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). 
84 Va. Code Ann. §§ 58-238.1 to .38 (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
85 1981 Va. Acts, ch. 399 (codified at Va. Code Ann. § 58-238.38 (Cum. Supp. 1981)). 
88 Va. Code Ann. § 58-238.38(E) (Cum. Supp. 1981). 
87 For additional discussion of Sundin, see notes 44-51 supra and accompanying text. 
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legislation, 88 the decision nonetheless provides guidance for deter-
mining whether the new legislation is merely coextensive with ex-
isting judicial remedies or whether it is the exclusive remedy for 
preventing unjust enrichment in wrongful killing cases. 
In Leonard v. Counts,89 the Court imposed a constructive trust 
against a husband and wife following their repudiation of an oral 
agreement, made by the husband at an auction sale, to purchase a 
piece of property jointly with another person.90 The Court found 
sufficient evidence in the totality of the circumstances to support 
the trial court's finding that the parties in fact had made an oral 
agreement to be joint purchasers.91 The Supreme Court believed 
that it was appropriate to impose a constructive trust in the case, 
"to prevent fraud or injustice."92 Although the chancellor had 
stated that he was not holding that "any fraud occurred" in the 
case, the Supreme Court distinguished "actual" from "construc-
tive" fraud and noted that "[a] constructive trust arises not only 
when there has been actual fraud, but whenever one holding title 
to property 'is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another 
on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were per-
mitted to retain it.' "93 The Court accordingly affirmed the trial 
court's holding that the husband and wife94 held the property cov-
ered by the oral agreement as constructive trustees for the other 
party.95 
11 See notes 2, 29-51 supra and accompanying text . 
.. 221 Va. 582, 272 S.E.2d 190 (1980). 
•• The Court found that Mr. Leonard and Mr. Counts agreed at the auction to be joint 
purchasers of the property and tentatively agreed to the boundaries and to the percentage 
of the total price each party would pay. Mr. Leonard ultimately bad the property conveyed 
only to himself and then tendered a deed to a portion of the property to Mr. Counts with 
restrictions to which the parties had not agreed. Id. at 587-88, 272 S.E.2d at 194. 
" The Court noted that an agreement that forms the basis for a constructive trust may 
be proven by parol evidence without violating the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 587, 272 S.E.2d 
at 194. 
'" Id. at 588, 272 S.E.2d at 195. 
" Id. at 590, 272 S.E.2d at 195-96 (quoting A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 462, at 3413 (3d 
ed. 1967)). 
.. The Court rejected the argument that it should not impose constructive trust relief 
against Mrs. Leonard because she was not a party to the oral agreement. The Court con-
cluded that Mr. Leonard was acting as his wife's agent in the transaction, and that she 
therefore was bound by his oral agreement. Id. at 591, 272 S.E.2d at 196. 
'" The Court noted that this case could have been decided by imposing a purchase money 
resulting trust to carry out the presumed intentions of the parties. Id. at 588, 272 S.E.2d at 
194-95. One of the various instances in which a purchase money resulting trust arises by 
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B. Intestate Succession From an Illegitimate 
In King v. Commonwealth, 96 the paternal relatives of an illegiti-
mate child challenged a lower court's decree that the illegitimate 
decedent's estate must escheat to the Commonwealth because the 
decedent had no living maternal relatives. The paternal relatives 
claimed that the Virginia statute97 permitting illegitimate children 
to inherit and transmit inheritances only on the maternal side was 
unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment because it in-
vidiously discriminated on the basis of illegitimacy.98 These claim-
ants relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Trimble v. Gordon,99 which held that a similar Illinois statute al-
lowing illegitimate children to inherit only through their mothers 
was invalid on equal protection grounds. 
In rejecting the claimants' argument, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia first noted that it must analyze the challenged statute in light 
of the case's specific facts. Ioo It then proceeded to distinguish 
Trimble from King on its facts. In Trimble, the claimant was an 
illegitimate child who had been denied her intestate share of her 
father's estate, even though a judicial proceeding during the fa-
ther's lifetime had determined his paternity. The United States 
Supreme Court invalidated the statute on which the state had 
based its denial. The King Court refused to sanction a legislative 
classification that distinguished between legitimate and illegiti-
mate children in their receipt of statutory benefits. IOI 
In King, however, the claimants were relatives of the decedent's 
putative fatherI02 whose paternity had never been adjudicated or 
acknowledged. King therefore presented the question of the con-
stitutionality of a statutory classification based not upon the legiti-
macy or illegitimacy of the claimant, but rather upon the claim-
operation of law is when "prior to the purchase one person binds himself to pay purchase 
money and stands behind his commitment, but title is conveyed to another." Id., 272 S.E.2d 
at 195. Because the complaint only addressed the constructive trust theory, however, the 
Court did not rely on a purchase money resulting trust rationale for its decision. Id. 
•• 221 Va. 251, 269 S.E.2d 793 (1980). 
07 1902-04 Va. Acts, ch. 430 (formerly codified at Va. Code Ann.§ 64.1-5 (1950)) (repealed 
1978). See notes 106-08 infra and accompanying text. 
•• 221 Va. at 252, 269 S.E.2d at 794. 
09 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
200 221 Va. at 253-54, 269 S.E.2d at 794-95. 
201 Id. 
102 Id. The claimants were the children of the decedent's putative father's brother. 
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ant's maternal or paternal kinship with the decedent.103 In 
upholding the statute, the Court held that a classification distin-
guishing between maternal and paternal relatives is not suspect 
under a traditional equal protection analysis and the Common-
wealth need only support such a classification with a rational 
basis.10' 
Although the General Assembly has repealed the statute chal-
lenged in King, 1015 other constitutional attacks on it are still possi-
ble because the law remains applicable in cases where the decedent 
died before July 1, 1978. In cases where the decedent died after 
June 30, 1978, however, a different statute applies,1°8 provid-
ing-under certain circumstances107-for inheritance on the pater-
nal side by and from illegitimate children whose parents never 
marry.1os 
C. Testamentary Capacity 
In Thomason v. Carlton, 109 the Supreme Court of Virginia held 
that an elderly testatrix did have testamentary capacity when she 
executed a will excluding her daughter. In rejecting the daughter's 
challenge to the will, the Court found that "the evidence was over-
Joi There were no maternal relatives involved in the King case. The contest was between 
the paternal relatives and the escheater of the City of Fredericksburg, proceeding under 
Chapter 10 of Title 55. See generally Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-168 to -201.l (Repl. Vol. 1981). 
"" 221 Va. at 254, 269 S.E.2d at 795. The Court found that, in light of the Common-
wealth's need to provide for the orderly disposition of property at death, the rational basis 
for the statuto was the greater difficulty in proving paternity. Id. 
Joa See note 97 supra. 
Joe Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-5.1(2) (Rep!. Vol. 1980). For a discussion of the new statute, see 
64 Va. L. Rev. 1543, 1553-54 (1978). 
Jo• illegitimate children whose parents never marry may inherit and may transmit inheri-
tances on the paternal side if 
[t]he paternity is established by clear and convincing evidence as set forth in § 64.1-
5.2; provided, however, that the paternity establishment [sic] pursuant to this sub-
paragraph b shall be ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to inherit from or 
through the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his and has not 
refused to support the child. 
Va. Code Ann. § 64.1-5.1(2)(b) (Rep!. Vol. 1980). 
Joi If the parents of the illegitimate have participated in a marriage ceremony, then, 
"even though the attempted marriage was prohibited by law, deemed null or void or dis-
solved by a court," inheritance rights are extended to and from illegitimates on the same 
basis as legitimates. Id. § 64.l-5.1(2)(a). 
Joe 221 Va. 845, 276 S.E.2d 171 (1981). 
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whelming"110 that the testatrix possessed testamentary capacity. 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's decision and set 
aside the jury's verdict. m 
Although the three-member majority stated that "the simple is-
sue in this case is mental competency,"112 two dissenters suggested 
instead that "[a]t this appellate stage of the proceeding, the real 
question is whether there is credible evidence to support the jury's 
conclusion on the issue of competency."118 The dissent stated that 
if there is credible evidence to support the jury's verdict, the ap-
pellate court should not disturb it.11• Furthermore, the dissent 
noted that on appeal following a jury verdict favorable to the con-
testants, the contestants are entitled to have the evidence in the 
case considered in a light most favorable to them.115 Following this 
analysis, and finding "credible, substantial evidence to support the 
jury's findings,"116 the dissenters would have affirmed the lower 
court's refusal to probate the testatrix's will. 
The dissenting opinion's reasoning is compelling. Thomason will 
encourage litigants who have already had their day in court to at-
tempt to relitigate factual issues of competency de novo before the 
Supreme Court. This avenue of review opened by the Court will 
result in additional cost and delay to the parties before final reso-
lution of their cases. 
110 Id. at 856, 276 S.E.2d at 177. 
111 Id., 276 S.E.2d at 178. 
112 Id., 276 S.E.2d at 177. 
113 Id. at 856-57, 276 S.E.2d at 178 (emphasis in original). 
114 Id. at 857, 276 S.E.2d at 178 (citing Eason v. Eason, 203 Va. 246, 253, 123 S.E.2d 361, 
366 (1962)). 
"" Id. (citing Lewis v. Roberts, 207 Va. 742, 744, 152 S.E.2d 44, 45 (1967)). 
11• Id. 
